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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

DOUGLAS F. CLOSE,
(
Defendant-Appellant. }

Case No.

12554

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is a criminal appeal from the District Court
of the Second Judicial District, Weber County, State of
Utah, wherein appellant, Douglas Fairbanks Close, was
convicted by a jury of the crime of indecent assault upon
a child under fourteen years, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated, 76-7-9.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was sentenced by the Honorable Calvin
Gould, Judge, to confinement in the Utah State Prison

2

for a term not to exceed five years after a jury verdict
finding appellant guilty of the crime of "Indecent Assault
upon a child under fourteen years."
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the lower court conviction
and judgment affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant spent the afternoon of August 16, 1970,
at the Rainbow Gardens swimming pool in Ogden, Utah
(R-83). He testified that during the afternoon he had
been assisting children to perform water gymnastics by
flipping them or turning them with his hands (R-83-85).
Appellant was assisting many children at many different
times with such tricks.

At the Rainbow Gardens there are two pools; one
indoor and one outdoor. Appellant would move from one
of these pools to the other at various time (R-86). On '
that afternoon one of the children who joined in the gym·
nastic games with appellant was Cathrene Holbrook, age
nine. She was also joined by her younger sister, Elizabeth,
age seven (R-51). Cathrene was thrown into the air sev·
eral times by appellant, as were many other children,
while in the outside pool. The activity later moved to
the inside pool where appellant continued to throw or flip ,
the children (R-52). Cathrene testified that after a short
time the other children left and while she was with ap·
pellant alone he rubbed the front of her legs on the inside
1

1

3

and outside of the swimming
then told appellant she had a
to leave the pool (R-53). She
pool by her father and taken
mothrr of the event (R-54).

suit (R-52-53). Cathrene
stomach ache and wanted
was later picked up at the
home, where she told her

Appellant was picked up at the pool by the Ogden
City Police on the same date (R-76-77). He was later
convicted by jury verdict of indecent assault on a child
under fourteen years, said conviction being based on the
above facts.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL C 0 UR T COMMITTED NO
ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT ON
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES.
The law in this state allows instructions to be given
to the jury for lesser offenses, which may be included
within the offense with which the defendant is charged.
The Utah Code Annotated, states at 77-33-6 that:
"The jury may find the defendant guilty of
any offense the commission of which is necessarily
included in that with which he is charged in the
indictment or information, or of an attempt to
commit the offense."
However, it is very clear that the burden for making
certain such instructions are given rests substantially
with the defense. At no place in the record does it show
that ::i.ppelbnt requested instructions as to lesser included

4

offenses. Under such circumstances, this court has made
it clear that there can be no valid claim of prejudicial
error. As the court said in State v. Courtney, 10 Utah 2d
200, 350 P. 2d 619 (1960):
"Defendant claims that the trial court erred
in failing to instruct the jury as to lesser included
offenses. However, he admits that no request was
made for such instructions and thus the court did
not err in its failure to give them." At 203.
Such has been the rule in Utah since People v. Robinson, 6 Utah 101, 21 P. 403 (1889), where appellant was
convicted of murder and the only instructions given were
as to degrees of murder. Appellant alleged error because
no instruction on assault with intent to do bodily injury
was given. The court said:
"It is objected that the court did not instruct
the jury that they could convict of assault with i
intent to do bodily harm, although that was included in the charge set forth in the indictment.
We do not think that it is always necessary that
the court instruct the jury as to all lesser offenses,
although they may be embraced within the charge
set forth in the indictment, and of which the <lefendant might be convicted ... The law does not
require this, but when there are degrees of the
offense charged it is the duty of the court to so
instruct the jury. Beyond this the statute does
not go, except to say that 'the court must state
to them all matter of law necessary for their information.' . . . The giving of said instruction,
therefore, measurably depends upon whether the
case be one where it would seem to be necessary
for the information of the jury. The court's atten1

1
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tion was not called specially to the offense uf
assault with intent to do bodily injmy. Had
been, the instruction would probably have been
given. But the failure to give it, under the circumstances, could not be sufficient ground to reverse
the judgment or for granting a new trial." At 105.
Thus, the only requirement in this case would have
been to instmct the jury as to degrees of indecent assault
upon a child less than fourteen years, were there degrees
to :-mch an offense.
Where error is claimed because an instruction was
to leso>H included offrn::;cs, it is error of the
defense if it did not request such instruction. See State
v. Sulliuan, 73 Utah 582, 276 P. 166 (1929); State v. Ferguson, 7-1 Utah 268, 279 P. 55 (1929); State v. Mitchell,
3 Utah 2d 70, 278 P. 2d G18 (1955); State v. Dodge, 19
Utah 2d 44, 425 P. 2d 781 (1967). All of these cases follow
the holding in Sullivan, supra, which said:
not given as

"Moreover, the great weight of authority is
that, before a defendant can be heard to complain
because the trial court did not instruct upon the
law of lesser offenses included within the crime
charged, such defendant must have requested instruction upon the included offense or offenses."
At 591.
It is clear that appellant's claim of error being committed by the trial court Yvhen no instruction was given
for the offense of simple assault, cannot stand. The rule
in Utah shows very clearly that the burden for an instruction of lesser included offenses rests with the de-
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fense and defense made no effort to submit such an instruction in appellant's trial.
POINT II.
THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMITTED BY
THE COURT WHEN IT INSTRUCTED THE
JURY AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF INDECENT ASSAULT UPON A CHILD UNDER
FOURTEEN.
The offense of indecent assault upon a child under
fourteen is set out by Utah Code Ann. 76-7-9 as follows:
"Every person who shall assault a child, whether
male or female, under the age of fomt2en years,
and shall take indecent liberties with or on the
person of such child, without committing, intending or attempting to commit the crime of rape,
upon such child, with or without the child's consent, is guilty of a felony."
Appellant contends that the word and in the statute sets
out a requirement that an offender must assault and take
indecent liberties with a child under fourteen before there
is a violation of the statute. His contention is that a
proper instruction which sets out the elements of the
crime must cont.:iin words to the effect that the jury must
find that appellant did assault and take indecent liberties.
Further, he contends assault should be defined by an
instruction sf;';;ting out the elements of the offense of
simple assault.
Appellant's contention is not one which is novel be-
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fore this Court. The same question arose n1 State v.
McMillan, 46 Utah 19, 145 P. 833 (1915). There the

Court said:

[T]hat the term "indecent liberties," as used in
the statute, is clearly self-defining. What mor2
could be said, except to state the evidence which
proves or establishes the offense? We think that
every person of the most ordinary intelligence and
understanding, who is familiar with merely the
rudiments of the English language, understands
what is meant when he, or any one else, is charged
with having taken indecent liberties with the person of a child. To say more is merely to explain
what was done, which, like in a charge of carnal
knowledge, or of assault with intent to have carnal
knowledge, is not neccesary. Id. at 22.
Then in State v. Saunders, 82 Utah 170, 22 P. 2d 1043
(19;rn), the court again met the same issue of error. The
decision cited and followed the law as it was stated in
McMillan, supra, when it said:
"If the tem1s 'indecent assault' and 'indecent liberties' are convertible terms, there is nothing to be
gained by a lengthy discussion as to the purpose
or meaning of the word 'assault' in the above sbtute, or the amount of violence necessary to constitute an indecent assault or taking indecent liberties with a child, and we are satisfied to leave the
matter with the statement that the conduct of the
defendant in this case as above set forth was
clearly sufficient to violate the terms of the above
statute." At 174.

Thus, it is clear that this Court has interpreted Section
7f-i-7-9, Utah Code Annotated, to the effect that it is not
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necessary that the district Court give instructions to the
jury that they must find assault and the taking of indecent liberties before there has been an offense committed. The Court has determined that an instruction to
find the taking of indecent liberties is enough for reasonable men to make a determination upon the guilt or innocence of the offender. The reason for the Court not requiring an instruction on assault was made clear in State
v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P. 2d 445 (1965). In that
case of indecent assault upon a child under fourteen years,
the lower court gave the added instruction for simple
assault. Becaus2 the instruction for simple assault includes the term:
" . . . Coupled with a present ability to commit a
violent injury on the person of another. U. C. A.
76-7-1" (Emphasis added.)
the jury there became confused as to the necessary elements constitut:ng a crime under Utah Code Ann. 76-7-9.
To dispel the confusion over the term "violent injury,"
included in i:h2
the Court pointed out:
"The jurors, quite understandably, appeared to
have been confused by this definition, being under
the impression that the term 'violent injury' mean:'
a physical impact sufficient to cause some substantial and noticeable injury. Without detailing the
somewhat extended discussion, it is sufficient to
say that the court correctly disabused their
of the impression that any such aggravated assauh
was necessary and we perceive no error in what
was said." At 377.
From these cases it is evident that the term assault

has been interpreted to be interchangeable with the term
taking indecent liberties when a court is confronted with
a violation of U. C. A. 76-7-9. Further, this Court has also
determined that what constitutes a violation of the statutory terminology, "taking indecent liberties," will be left
for reasonable men to determine upon the evidence. Thus,
it is clear that there was no error by the lower court when
it di<l not instrnct the jury on assault. The instruction
on taking indec('nt libe ..ties v1as sufficient explanation of
violation for the jury to detcnnine guilt or innocence.

POINT III.
THERE w AS no ERROR COMMITTED
W HE N THE LOWER COURT DID NOT
GIVE CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS.
Appclbnt contends there should have been cautionary ir.sti u2tions given in the lower court, even though
no:ic were requested, because of the nature of the case.
This state established the rule that cautionary instrnctions are not only not necessary but that they may
ad as an invasion of the province of the jury. In State
v. Rutledge, G3 Utah 546, 227 P. 2d 479 (1924), this Court
set out the law as follows:
The trial court properly instructed the jm·y
upon the presumption of the defendant's innocence, and the requirement that his guilt must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt, and further
instructed them that they were the exclusive
judges of the facts, the weight of the evidence, and
the credibility of the witnesses, and pointed out
their right to consider the bias, interest, or motive
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of any witness, etc., and enjoined upon them thei:·
duty, if possible, to reconcile the evidence with
the presumption of defendant's innocence.
Under these circumstances no error was committed by the refusal to give the cautionary instructions requested by defendant. At 551.
Prior to this the Court held that cautionary instructions could not be given where they might prejudice the
testimony of one witness as against that of another unless there was a statutory requirement to do so. In State
v. Shaw, 59 Utah 536, 205 P. 239 (1922), this Court ruled:
While cautionary instructions respecting the
weight or effect of certain evidence are sometimes
proper, yet great care should be exercised by the
court in giving such instructions, and in no event
should the court single out the statements of one
witness, unless such a course is required by the
statute or authorized by law. At 540.
This position was again upheld in State v. Jamison, 103
Utah 129, 134 P. 2d 173 (1943) as follows:
We also find the court did not err in refusing
to give defendant's requested "cautionary instructions" that the statements of the prosecutrix
should be scrutinized with care and her motives,
bias and interest taken into consideration in giving
any weight to her testimony. The court gave correct instructions as to the presumption of innocence of the defendant, that the guilt of the defendant must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that the jury was the sole judge of the
facts in the case of the credibility of witnesses, of
'
.
the weight and effect of the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. At 136.

11
In State v. Olsen, 100 Utah 174, 111 P. 2d 548 (1941),
this court once more upheld the rule that there need not
be cautionary instructions, citing Rutledge, supra, and
Shaw, supra.
These cases mate it clear that in this state it is not
only unnecessary to give cautionary instructions, but it
may often be prejudicial error to do so.
Appellant cites two California cases as precedent for
overturning the above rule. An examination of those cases
will show that a cautionary instruction is not mandatory
even as a rule of law in that State. In People v. Putnam,
20 Cal. 2d 885, 129 P. 2d 367 (1942), the Court ruled
that a cautionary instrnction should have been given because:
"The circumstances of the case must determine
whether the failure to instruct the jury constitutes
prejudicial error.... It is apparent from the record in the present case, however, that the failure
to give a cautionary instruction was prejudicial
and that a different verdict would not have been
improbable had the error not occurred.... In view
of the circumscribed extent of the acts alleged and
the inconsistencies in the witness' testimony, it
is doubtful whether the same verdict would have
been rendered had the cautionary instruction been
given." At 370.
Then, in People v. Nye, 237 P. 2d 1 (Cal. 1951), the Court
refused to overturn a decision for lack of a cautionary
instruction. There, the Court said:

The circumstances of each case determine whether
failure to give the instruction was prejudicial. In
the cases in which judgments were reversed for
failure to give the instruction, it was not imprnbable that the jury would have returned a different
verdict had the cautionary instruction been given.
The decision then pointed out that:
Under the circumstances of several other cases,
failure to give a cautionary instruction was not
prejudicial.
And it concluded:
A careful examination of the entire record ...
us to the conclusion that it is improbahle that the
jury would have rejected the testimony of the
prosecuting witnesses had a cautionary instruction
been given and that there has therefore been no
miscarriage of justice requiring reversal of the
judgment. At 5.
Thus, even were Utah to adopt the California rule
as to cautionary instructions at this date, there would
still be no error in the present case. Proceeding upon the
question under the California law the Court could examine the record here and find that there were no inconsistencies or major mistakes in the testimony of the prosecuting witnesses. It is not likely that, "a different verdict
would have been probable."
Under the law of this State, as it now stands, there
was no error because there was no cautionary instruction.
There was instruction as to appellant's presumption of
innocence (R. 15), and as this Court has pointed out,
a cautionary instruction was unnecessary. Where the tes-
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timony and the evidence is clear, as in the case at bar,
the rule heretofore adopted in this jurisdiction should be
retained.
POINT IV.
THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER PRIOR DECISIONS TO ALLOW A JUDGE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF COURT RECORDS
FROM THE SAME JUDICIAL DISTRICT.
Appellant took the stand to testify in his own behalf.
During cross-examination by the prosecution, the attempt
was made to impeach the testimony of appellant by showing a prior conviction of a felony. Appellant would not
admit that he had any previous felony convictions (R93) . \Vhen appellant would not admit prior convictions,
the prosecutor attempted to enter appellant's criminal
record into evidence as State's Exhibit "A" (R-94). The
followin'.!, then ensued:
"MR. McCULLOCH: I will object, your
Honor, I don't think the custodian of the official
records has been placed on the stand to either
qualify the document or lay a foundation for it.
MR. STRATFORD: I think it is a matter
of judicial knowledge, this thing was filed with the
Second Judicial District Court.
THE COURT: I think where it is our own
Court record, I think I can recognize it, Mr. McCuJloch. If it came from another district, I think
perhaps not.
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The objection is overruled and the exhibit is
received in evidence (R-94) ."
.Appellant now contends that it was error for the district
court to take judicial notice of its own records in any
case other than the one before it. His allegation is based
upon the decision of this court in Robinson v. Kelley, 69
Utah 376, 255 P. 430 (1927); and Spencer v. Industrial
Commission, Sl Utah 511, 20 P. 2d 618 (1933). In Spencer, supra, the com't said:
The rule applicable to judicial proceedings is that,
while a court may take judicial notice of the proceedings and records in the cause before it, the
court cannot in one case tal{e judicial notice of its
own records in another and different case. At 513.
At first reading it would appear that these words indicate '
reversible error in the case at bar. A more in-depth re·
search of the cases reveals that the decisions should be
more narrowly restricted than the broad general applica- 1
tion appellant is asking.
That part of the decisions in Robinson and Spencer,
upon which appellant relies in asking for a reversal is this
Court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 78-25-1 (3) as
it applied to those cases. Utah Code Ann. 78-25-1 (3)
states:
Courts take judicial notice of the following facts:

* * *

(3) Public and private official acts of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of
this state and of the United States.
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This statute is a part of the Utah Judicial Code and is
worded almost identical to West's Ann. Cal. Code §
187.5 (3) which says:
Courts take judicial notice of the follovving facts:

* * *
(3) Public and private official acts of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of
this state and of the United States, and the lawR
of the several states of the United States and the
interpretation thereof by the highest courts of
appellate jurisdiction of such states.
The reason for the almost identical wording of the two
statutes is that the Utah statute was a part of the former
Utah Code of Civil Procedure until the state legislature
passed a revised Code of Civil Procedure and entitled it,
in part, the Judicial Code of 1951, see Laws of Utah 1951,
Ch. 58 § 1. The former Utah Code of Civil Procedure
was enacted on March 13, 1884, to become effective on
Augw;t 1 of that year, and was taken almost directly and
entirely from the California Code of Civil Procedure as
it was at that time. Enactment of the California Code
was in 1872 with revisions in 1901; See Cal. Stats. 1901,
Ch. 102, p. 241 § 464. Though the Utah statute has been
placed under a new title, the wording has not changed
(except to change the word territory to state) since its
original adaptation from the California Code of Civil Procedure in 1884; See Laws of Utah 1884, Ch. 55 p. 357 §
1149 (3) . The California Code of Civil Procedure § 1875
was repealed by Cal. Stats. 1965, Ch. 299, p. 1360 § 61
(operative Jan. 1, 1967) and replaced by several broader

'1
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statutes. See Deering's Cal. Codes Ev. Code Ann. § 1875.
Dming that period of time which Utah and California
had identical statutes governing judicial notice of court
records, 1884-1967, the Utah Court heard only the Robinson and Spencer cases. But the California Court heard
many cases, most of them more recent and with a much
broader interpretation than Johnson v. Ota, 43 Cal. App.
2d 94, 110 P. 2d 507 (1941), which was cited in appellant's
brief.
In Willson v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 21 Cal. 2d
705, 134 P. 2d 800 (1943), the California Supreme Court
said:
"Generally a court takes judicial notice only
of proceedings in the same case. . . . But in some
circumstances judicial notice will be taken of proceedings in other cases in the same court in the
interests of justice." At 804.
Thus, they broadened the interpretation of the scope
of the statute in question. This position was then followed in Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., Etc., 62
Cal. App. 2d 601, 145 P. 2d 344 (1944) (refusing to allow
notice to be taken of proceedings from a different court):
DeMoburn v. Sheet Metal Workers International Ass'n,
140 Cal. App. 2d 546, 295 P. 2d 881 (1956), (taking notice
of previous action between same parties) ; Smith v. Smith,
135 Cal. App. 2d 100, 286 P. 2d 1009 (1955), (court took
notice of same court's record of contempt judgment in another case). Finally, in Weil v. Barthel, 279 P. 2d 544
(Cal. App. 1955) , affirmed 45 C. 2d 835, 291 P. 2d 30
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( 1955), the Supreme Court ruled on the best interpretation of Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 1875, when it said:

"Section 1875 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides: 'Courts take judicial notice of * * *
[p ]ublic and private official acts of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of this state
* * *.' By its terms, the section is sufficiently
broad to allow judicial notice to be taken of the
record in another action, either in the same court,
or in a different court of the state.'' At 546.
The court then went on to allow judicial notice of a
prior judgment in the same court.
It must also be realized that the statute relied upon
by appellant has only been ruled upon as it applies to
civil cases. The intent of the court in those cases was to
not allow bar or res judicata being raised when there has
been no proper fow1dation for such pleading.

The application of this statute under its present interpretation in Utah to criminal proceedings can only
work a hardship upon the state and allow a defendant
to defeat the measure of justice. The questions which
were asked of appellant in the lower court were questions
of fact. When he would not answer directly the prosecuto attempted to prove them by placing previous court
records of appellant into evidence. The judge was very
r,a.reful about being able to recognize the authenticity of
the records before he took notice of them. If the present
rule of law of judicial notice of court records should be
applied hereunder it would be unrealistic. The prosecutor's question was one of simple fact, a fact which did
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not need to be left to the jury to decide because it could
be shown by record that the appellant had been convicted
of a prior fdony. A judge is very capable of determining
the authenticity of orders and signatures, often of his own,
within his district when there is a fact to be proven by
a record in a criminal case.
As stated by Professors Arthur Kieffe, William
Landis, ,Jr., and Robert Shaad in 2 Stanford L. Rev. 664
(1949-50):
"As the calendars of American courts become
more crowded the lawyers and the courts must
look to an ever increasing extent for a means of
disposing of collateral issues. The doctrine of judicial notice, when correctly applied, can be of invaluable aid to all the parties in reducing court
time and avoiding unnecessary proof. In this day
and age it is high time that we recognized facts
which are indisputably true.... "
"Although a few cases indicate the danger
from the unintelligent use of the doctrine, isn't
the real danger from the other direction? Is it not
too often the failure of our courts to use judicial
notice at all, rather than its misuse, that should
cause public anxiety?"
"The authorities agree that judicial notice is
a tool - an aid in shortening and improving trial
procedure. Failure to use it tends daily to smother
trials with technicality and monstrously lengthen
them out, and in some cases (as will be shown
later) actually denies due process, thus breeding
contempt for our judicial system." At 664-65.
Were this Court to allow judicial notice of prior court
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records to be taken in a criminal proceeding in the same
court as the noticed record originated in, it would work
no hardship on justice but normally only go to proving a
fact. The circumstances are quite different in the criminal from the civil proceeding. There is no attempt to
adjudge a defendant guilty or not guilty upon his prior
record, only the necessity of showing a fact.
The interpretaticn of the rule has been broadened
by the interpretation of the California Court
to the extent that it would certainly allow this Court to
reconsider the decisions in Robinson and Spencer and
narrow their application. As the California Court said
in Weil, supra:
"The basis for allowing judicial notice to be
taken is not alone to avoid hardship but to facilitate the administration of justice by dispensing
with the necessity of formal proof in cases where
there is no real need for evidence. It is characterized as a 'judicial short cut'. . . . The same considerations which underlie the rule of judicial notice generally, make it applicable to records in
other actions. Normally such records are assumed
to be correct and a controversy concerning their
existence would be extremely unlikely." At 547.
To allow the lower court to take judicial notice of a
record which will prove a fact in a criminal case would be
to allow an expedient administration of justice under a
broad statute. This Court should now expand the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-1 (3) to allow judicial notice of a prior record to prove a fact in a criminal
proceeding.
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CONCLUSION
The record of the instant case shows appellant received a fair and proper trial under the laws of the State
of Utah. The trial court committed no error and allowed
records of prior convictions to be entered as evidence only
to prove facts which appellant would not admit under
oath.
Therefore, respondent respectfully submits that this
Court affirm the decision of the lower court.
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